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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §78-2A-3(f) (1953).

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court err when it substituted the judge's
opinion as to what is best for the Defendant and refused to
instruct the jury on the requested lesser-included offense of
disobeying a peace officer pursuant to case law and Utah Code
Annotated §76-1-402.

(R. at 102-105).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review presents a question of law.
Therefore, the appellate court should review the trial court's
determination concerning jury instructions for correctness and
accord it no particular deference.

State v. Jones, 878 P.2d

1175, 243 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App. 1994).

State v. Singh,

819 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 832 P.2d (Utah
1992) .

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13 (1953).

(See Appendix 1 ) .

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13.5 (1953).

(See Appendix 2 ) .

Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-402(3) (4) (5) ( 1953) .

(See

Appendix 3 ) .
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 21(e) (1994).
1

(See Appendix 4 ) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a case involving an alleged attempt to elude or flee
a peace officer.

B.

Proceedings Below.

On March 8, 1994, Defendant Curtis Galen Green Simpson (Mr.
Simpson) was arrested on Interstate 15 in Millard County, State
of Utah.

On March 9, 1994, a criminal complaint was filed

against Mr. Simpson charging him with eluding or fleeing a peace
officer pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-13.5, a third-degree
felony.

(R. at 2 ) . At trial, Mr. Simpson sought to include in

the jury instructions a lesser included offense of disobeying a
peace officer, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-13.
102-105) .

(R. at

The judge determined that it was not in the

Defendant's best interest to include an instruction on the
lesser-included offense; consequently, the court denied
Defendant's request for the proposed jury instruction (R. at 102105) and the jury found Defendant guilty of fleeing or eluding a
peace officer.

(R. at 129, 130) .

A notice of appeal was sent on August 8, 1994.

(R. at 119).

The notice of appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals on
August 15, 1994.

(R. at 120).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 8, 1994, Mr. Simpson was traveling South in Millard
County on Interstate 15.

At mile post 163, deputies from the

Millard County Sheriff's Department attempted to stop him as a
suspect in a retail gas theft which had occurred 20 or 25 minutes
earlier in Scipio, Utah.

(Rec. at 76-79).

Mr. Simpson failed to

respond to the flashing lights of the officer's vehicle and
increased speed to 80 to 85 miles per hour.

Mr. Simpson

continued southbound on 1-15 for 11 miles to mile post 152.

(R.

at 79). At mile post 152 Mr. Simpson voluntarily stopped his
car, exited his vehicle, and turned himself over to the sheriff's
deputies.

(R. at 94-95).

Mr. Simpson was charged with eluding or fleeing a peace
officer pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-13.5, a third-degree
felony.

At trial, Mr. Simpson sought to include in the jury

instructions a lesser included offense of disobeying a peace
officer, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 41-6-13.
104).

(R. at 102-

The judge determined that it was not in the Defendant's

best interest to include an instruction on the lesser-included
offense; consequently, the court denied Defendant's request for
the proposed jury instruction (R. at 102-105) and the jury found
Defendant guilty of fleeing or eluding a peace officer.
129, 130).

3

(R. at

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Both the facts and the issue at bar are very straight
forward.

Mr. Simpson was driving southbound on 1-15 when a

police car behind him turned on its lights and siren.
80).

(R. at

Instead of immediately pulling off the road, Mr. Simpson

increased his speed from the posted speed limit of 65 mph to 8085 miles an hour, at which point he maintained that speed for
several miles.

(R. at 93). Mr. Simpson then complied with the

police request and pulled off into a rest area, voluntarily
stopping his car and turning himself over to the sheriff's
deputies.

(R. at 84-89).

Except, arguably, for the slight

increase in speed on an open, empty freeway, there was no effort
made by Mr. Simpson to evade the deputy--he did not try to outrun
the police, attempt to turn around and head north-bound, nor take
an off-ramp to flee or evade pursuit.

Instead, he drove along on

the freeway for a few minutes and then fully complied with all
requests of the deputies.

(R. at 94). His actions were not

unlike the more famous, or infamous, Mr. Simpson, who led police
down the freeway for a time in his white Bronco until he quit and
turned himself over to them.
The question then becomes whether or not a jury might have
seen the facts as described above and determined Mr. Simpson's
actions as a mere disobeying of a peace officer, a class B
misdemeanor, rather than fleeing or evading a peace officer, a
third degree felony.

The judge determined that in his opinion

the instruction of the lesser-included offense was not in the
4

Defendant's best interest; therefore, the court did not allow the
option to be brought to the jury, instructing them only on the
felony charge.

This was reversible error.

P.2d 152, 159 (Utah, 1983),

State v. Baker, 671

explains that when a defendant

requests a lesser-included jury instruction, there is a two-part
evidence-based test to determine whether or not the trial court
is required to give it.

The first prong of the test is to show

if the lesser charge "is established by proof of the same or less
than all of the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged."

Id. at 159.

This is clearly the case at bar;

as the elements are the same between the two except the felony
includes an element of intent to evade or flee that the
misdemeanor does not.
The second prong of the test is whether the evidence
"provides a rational basis for a verdict of acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense."

Id. at 159.

The courts have stated that

where the evidence is susceptible to alternative interpretations,
and where an alternative would permit acquittal of the greater
offense and conviction of the lesser, the court must give the
lesser included offense instruction.

State v. Jones, at 36.

And

because the courts must view the facts in a light most favorable
to the defendant, (State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah
1986)), it is reasonable to believe a jury may have determined
that Mr. Simpson did not intend to flee or evade, but merely
refused to obey the sheriff's deputy for a time.
5

The test

established in State v. Baker has clearly been met and the
lesser-included instruction should have been given.

Mr. Simpson

is currently in prison for what could be nothing more than a
traffic violation.

The trier of fact was not given the

opportunity to decide that question.

As such, the court's ruling

should be reversed and Mr. Simpson granted a new trial with the
lesser-included instruction of disobeying a peace officer given
to the jury for its determination.

ARGUMENT
I.

WHETHER AN INSTRUCTION FOR A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE SHOULD
BE GIVEN TO THE JURY DEPENDS ON THE TEST ESTABLISHED IN
STATE V, BAKER USING U.C.A. 76-1-402.
The question of whether or not to include a lesser-included

charge to the jury in a jury instruction has been repeatedly
taken on appeal, both in Utah as well as the U.S. Supreme Court.
There is a large body of law on the issue.
878 P.2d 1175 (Utah App. 1994).

See State v. Jones,

State v. Singh, 819 P.2d 356,

360 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 832 P.2d (Utah 1992).
v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1983).
P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).

State

State v. Standiford, 769

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980).

Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, (1973).

It is clear from

these cases that this question is a question of law and therefore
this court should review the trial court's decision not to
include the jury instruction for correctness and accord the trial
court no particular deference.

State v. Jones, at 35.

Singh, at 360.
6

State v.

In State v. Baker the Utah Supreme Court gave an in-depth
analysis of the issue of lesser-included instructions and how to
determine whether or not to allow the additional charge to be
presented to the jury.

State v. Baker began its analysis by

giving some historical perspective to the issue, and pointing out
some confusion in using two different standards.

It then creates

a distinction as to whether or not the motion to include a
lesser-included offense was brought by the prosecution or the
defense.

A.

THE STANDARD WHEN THE MOTION IS BROUGHT BY THE
PROSECUTION.

Historically, State v. Baker explains, at common law the
jury was permitted to find the defendant guilty of any lesser
offense necessarily included in the offense charged.

This rule

originally developed as an aid to the prosecution in cases in
which the proof failed to establish some element of the crime
charged.

State v. Baker at 155, citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.

625, 633 (1980)(citations omitted).

This is the "necessarily

included offense" standard which is found in Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure 21 (e) (1994) :
The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the offense
charged or to any offense necessarily included in the
offense charged or an attempt to commit either the
offense charged or an offense necessarily included
therein.
U.C.A. 76-1-402(5) (1953) also refers to necessarily included
offenses:

7

If the district court on motion after verdict or
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for the offense
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or
judgment may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of
conviction entered for the included offense, without
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by
the defendant.
The requirement that the lesser offense be necessarily included
in the charged offense is for the protection of the defendant,
and to give the defendant notice that he could at the same time
face the lesser included offense charge.

State v. Baker at 155.

This stricture has developed from numerous decisions of the
Supreme Court emphasizing the restrictions that both the common
law and the Constitution have placed upon the power of the court
and prosecution to change the charging part of the indictment to
the jeopardy of the defendant.

Id. at 155.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Baker summarizes this
part of its analysis by holding that the "necessarily included
offense"

standard:

should be limited to cases where the prosecution
requests the instruction. The prosecution faces no
loss of life or liberty at trial and is not
constitutionally entitled to the same protections
afforded the defendant.
Id. at 156.

B.

THE STANDARD WHEN THE MOTION IS BROUGHT BY THE
DEFENDANT.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Beck v. Alabama, stated:
8

It has long been recognized that [the lesser-included
offense] can also be beneficial to the defendant
because it affords the jury a less drastic alternative
than the choice between conviction of the offense
charged and acquittal.
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633 (1980).
Further, in Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, (1973), the
High Court held:
Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's demand for a
jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a
defendant may be better off without such an
instruction. True, if the prosecution has not
established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of
the offense charged, the jury must, as a theoretical
matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant
is entitled to a lesser offense instruction--in this
context or any other--precisely because he should not
be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's
practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the
elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but
the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the
jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of
conviction.
Keeble, at 212-213 (emphasis in original).
The Court in Beck also warned of this risk:
Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and
leave behind all that their human experience has taught
them. The increasing crime rate in this country is a
source of concern to all Americans. To expect a jury
to ignore this reality and to find a defendant innocent
and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes
beyond doubt that he is guilty of some violent crime
requires of our juries clinical detachment from the
reality of human experience....
Beck, supra, at 642 (quoting Jacobs v. State, Ala., 361 So. 2d
640, 651-52 (1978), cert, denied., 439 U.S. 1122 (1979)).
Thus, where proof of any element of the crime is in dispute, the
availability of the "third option"--the choice of conviction of a
lesser offense rather than conviction of the greater or
9

acquittal--gives the defendant the benefit of the reasonable
doubt standard.

State v. Baker at 157.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Baker carefully pointed
out that the defendant's right to a lesser included offense
instruction is not absolute or unqualified, and cannot be based
merely on the "supposed notion of the jury's compassion or
leniency."

United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233 (9th

Cir. 1980)(cited in State v. Baker with approval at 157.)
The standard which has evolved in this regard is called the
evidence-based standard, as is widely recognized:
The principal has, accordingly, evolved that the
submission of a lesser degree or an included crime is
justified only where there is some basis in the
evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher
crime, and yet guilty of the lower one.
State v. Baker at 157-158.
This holding has been codified in U.C.A. 76-1-402(4) (1953):
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury
with respect to an included offense unless there is a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant
of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.
The definitions of an "included offense" are contained in the
preceding paragraph, 76-1-402(3).

That section contains three

alternative definitions, only one of which, (3)(a), is at issue
in this case.

Paragraph (3)(a) states that an offense is

included in a charged offense when "it is established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged."

The analysis of whether an

offense is included for purposes of deciding whether to grant a
10

defendant's request for a jury instruction must therefore begi
with the proof of facts at trial.

If the same facts tend to

prove elements of more than one statutory offense, then the
offenses are related under 76-1-402.

In that regard the court

State v. Baker stated:
However, where two offenses are related because some of
their statutory elements overlap, and where the
evidence at trial of the greater offense includes proof
of some or all of those overlapping elements, the
lesser offense is an included offense under subsection
(3) (a) .
State v. Baker at 159.
This holding creates the first step of the analysis to be used
the case at bar. It is essentially a mechanical, side-by-side
comparison of the statutorily defined elements of the crimes.
State v. Singh at 368.

There is a second step as well:

Under 76-1-402(4), the court is obligated to instruct
on the lesser offense only if the evidence offered
provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of
the included offense." This standard does not require
the court to weigh the credibility of the evidence, a
function reserved for the trier of fact. The court
must only decide whether there is a sufficient quantum
of evidence presented to justify sending the question
to the jury, a decision which must be made concerning
all jury instructions in any trial. When the elements
of two offenses overlap as discussed [above], if there
is a sufficient quantum of evidence to raise a jury
question regarding a lesser offense, then the court
should instruct the jury regarding the lesser offense.
State v. Baker at 159.
The court continues its analysis:
Similarly, when the evidence is ambiguous and therefore
susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater
offense and conviction of the lesser, a jury question
11

exists and the court must give a lesser included
offense instruction at the request of the defendant.
Id at 159.

See also, State v. Velarde at 453, State v. Jones at

36.
There have been several appellate cases on this issue since State
v. Baker was published.

All of those cases continue to follow

State v. Baker and its analysis.

II.

THE CASE AT BAR FULFILLS THE REQUIREMENTS OF STATE V. BAKER
AND REQUIRES THAT THE LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION BE GIVEN.
With the above legal analysis, it is now possible to assess

the facts of this case to determine if it indeed fits within the
test set out by State v. Baker and its progeny.
Regarding the first prong, it is quite evident that the two
crimes are related.

The crime of disobeying a peace officer is

found in U.C.A. 41-6-13.

The crime of eluding or fleeing a peace

officer is found in nearly the same place, U.C.A. 41-6-13.5.
One is apparently an enhancement of the other, which makes the
comparison of the two quite simple.

U.C.A. 41-6-13(1) reads:

A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply
with any lawful order or direction of any peace
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing
guard invested by law with authority to direct,
control, or regulate traffic.
In comparison, U.C.A. 41-6-13.5 (1) reads:
An operator who, having received a visual or audible
signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a
stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or
endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who
attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
12

Both crimes entail the willful failure or refusal to comply with
a lawful order or direction of a peace officer.

The felony adds

the element of willful or wanton disregard of the signal which
leads to the endangerment of any vehicle or person, or an attempt
to flee or elude a peace officer.

As explained above, the two

offenses are related because some of their statutory elements
overlap, and because the evidence at trial of the greater offense
includes proof of those overlapping elements.

Accordingly, the

lesser offense is an included offense under the first prong of
the test established in State v. Baker.
The more difficult issue is the second prong, whether the
evidence presented at the trial could be construed by the jury to
acquit of the felony and convict of the misdemeanor.

In this

case the facts are not ambiguous, and Mr. Simpson did not take
the stand.

Therefore, this court must review the facts presented

to determine if two outcomes are possible.
The evidence showed that on March 8, 1994, Mr. Simpson was
traveling South in Millard County on Interstate 15.

At mile post

163, deputies from the Millard County Sheriff's Department pulled
behind him in their vehicles. (R. at 76-79).

Mr. Simpson failed

to respond to the flashing lights of the officers' vehicles and
increased speed to 80 to 85 miles per hour.

Mr. Simpson

continued southbound on 1-15 for 11 miles to mile post 152.

(R.

at 79). At mile post 152, Mr. Simpson voluntarily stopped his
car, exited his vehicle, and turned himself over to the sheriff's
deputies.

(R. at 94-95).

Also brought out in trial was the fact
13

that Mr. Simpson did not continue to accelerate beyond the 80 to
85 miles an hour, nor did he attempt to take any exit along the
way or try to get away from the officers.

(R. at 93). When he

came to a stop it was gradual and Mr. Simpson did not "hop out of
his vehicle and run," but complied with every one of the
officer's orders.

(R. at 94).

A review of these facts in the light most favorable to Mr.
Simpson clearly shows a question of fact of whether Mr. Simpson
merely disobeyed the flashing lights or whether he intended to
flee or evade the officers.

It is certainly within a reasonable

purview of the jury to adjudge Mr. Simpson innocent of the felony
but guilty of the misdemeanor.

But without the third option, the

option of the lesser included crime, the jury had to choose
between complete acquittal or conviction of the felony and the
unambiguous evidence showed Mr. Simpson was guilty of some
criminal activity. As Beck explained:
To expect a jury to ignore this reality and to find a
defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the
evidence establishes beyond doubt that he is guilty of
some violent crime requires of our juries clinical
detachment from the reality of human experience....
Beck, supra, at 642.
As explained above, Under 76-1-402(4), the court is obligated to
instruct on the lesser offense if the evidence offered provides a
"rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense."
Accordingly, the court committed reversible error in failing to
follow the test established in State v. Baker and allow the
14

i:.st ruci:: ^r: ,

M-

> npson should be aiiuwea a

•

::.- ruction given to the -jury

-.-'L^-.JL

: :• addition c: railing •;• .-=.- • -.•v . ibaker to decernuiie wheLno •
cour f

.-*.: option.

esi established in State

•

u r t h e r exacerbated the ••_...: ;:

the instruction

(

,^H

i a] w:i th the

t:i t ict :i 01 1, 11 ie
••}. .

\

* used to deny

hi its explanati- .-. !o;i > o/ii.g Lhe lesser-

included rristrr. "tirm, H I M 1 \ j (j I i

n< 1:

Okay. The reason I did not include it, for the record,
is that the state does have the burden of proving each
and every element that has been charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the state fails to p r o v e , in
effect, the last element of the eluding or fleeing
charge, then my instructions tell the jury they are. to
find the defendant not guilty. I think that it is not
any loss, and not even in his best interest to have a
lesser included offense of which they might find him
guilty. If he is guilty of the offense as charged,
then the lesser included again is of no significance.
Its absence, I think, is probably in his best
interests. And counsel has noted his concerns and
reason for it, and the psychology of jurors. We don't
know what they do, but I think as a matter of law I
don't think there's a reason to include that lesser
included instruction or verdict form.
(R. 103-104) .
This logic goes d i rect ] y aga :i nst: wI: Iat: 11 Ie c : i 11: !:: st:ated :i n Keeble :
Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's demand for a
jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a
defendant may be better off without such an
instruction
Keeble at 212-213
j n ffae

(complete holding a b o v e ) .

casn at [in , I l)f> (.ouit. substituted

i 1 ;•'" 1 don of w.tjr.it. was

best tor the defendant, rather than allow the defendant to make
that d e c i s i o n himself.
as I h.

The court had no legal b a s i s for so doing

inst iiut i.-n ; Ii u M

t, lodi !y hdve been given pursuant to the

test established in State v. Baker.
lb

Accordingly, this matter

should be returned to the trial court for retrial with the lesser
included instruction given to the jury.

III. HARMLESS ERROR IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE ARGUMENT IN DEFENSE.
It is important to recognize that harmless error is not a
proper defense to the issue in this case.
justifications for this determination.

There are two

First, where the

appellate courts have determined no harm could have come to the
defendant for failing to include the instruction, it has been in
situations where the facts have shown that another, separate,
lesser included instruction was given to the jury and the
defendant was still convicted of the greater charge.

The logic

goes that if the jury convicted the defendant on the greater
crime where it had an opportunity to convict instead on a related
lesser-included charge, the jury would also not have convicted of
a still.lesser-included offense not allowed in by the trial
judge.

See

State v. Gotshall. 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)

(defendant convicted of second-degree murder with a manslaughter
instruction given, arguing that a negligent homicide instruction
should also have been given).

See also State v. Velarde, supra,

(which had nearly identical charges at issue.) In the case at bar
there were no other lesser included instructions given, only the
felony instruction as charged.
The second reason harmless error is not appropriate in this
case comes from the uncontroverted facts argued above.
Supreme Court explains in State v. Standiford:
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The Utah

[State v. Baker] held that a defendant's requested
lesser included offense instruction must be given when
there is some evidence which supports the theory
asserted by defendant. The requirement is more thar i
procedural nicety; it is rooted in defendant's
constitutional right to a jury trial. A defendant is
entitled to have his legal theory of the case placed
before the jury if it would not be superfluous to do so
because of an absence of any evidence to support the
theory.
Sometimes prosecutors overcharge, and
sometimes expected evidence just does not materialize.
In such cases, instructions on lesser offenses may be
essential to avoid injustice. Furthermore, juries
should not: be precluded from determining how criminal
conduct should be characterized and judged.
In all
events, a defendant has an absolute right to have the
jury instructed on a lesser crime, as long as there is
some evidence to support it.
769 P. 2d 254

UJi:ah 1 988) .

Defendant ',; tin Miry v\i^ 1 IM' Mr, ,( .*••:.-

did not - - . empt to flee

or evade the sherifl by trying to escape off an exit off-ramp,
turn around, or continue to increase speed, but that he "froze"
nil*-.!
L22).

i < l in*1- i' ml ' Mvif d'Mil v\

. ./. situation

(R

at 120-

The evidence further showed that whei I Mr. Simpson stopped,

he cooperated fully with the sheriff.
Meadow exit to go down some back road.
median and. turn north.
foot into the d a r k n e s s .

He did r t 1 ry !o take the
He did not skip the

He did not stop and bolt from his car on
In other words

Ii

Jid nol

elude or

flee

a peace officer, even though, he did disobey an officer of the
law

It., was then stated that disobeying an officer of the law is

not a felony and so he should be acquitted,

As the. Utah Supreme

Coui t stated above, the prosecution may well have overcharged the
Defendant, therefore the lesser included instruction needed to be
given to allow the ji iry to determine' how •
be characterized and adjudged.

i i na L -"oiiduci should

There is no ambiguity in the

facts, only in whether the facts should require a felonyconviction or misdemeanor.

Such a decision belongs to the trier

of fact, and is "rooted in defendant's constitutional right to a
jury trial."

State v. Standiford. 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).

CONCLUSION
According to the Utah Supreme Court, and pursuant to U.C.A.
76-1-402(4), when a defendant requests a lesser-included jury
instruction, there is a two-part evidence-based test to determine
whether or not the trial court is required to give it.

First, is

the lesser charge established by proof of the same or less than
all of the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged?

Second, does the evidence provide a rational

basis for a verdict of acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense?
In the case at bar, the elements to both charges are the
same except that the felony charge includes an element of intent
to evade or flee, which the misdemeanor does not.

Therefore, the

answer to the first question is yes, the lesser charge is
established by proof of less than all of the facts required to
establish the greater offense.

Responding to the second

question, the courts have stated that where the evidence is
susceptible to alternative interpretations, and where an
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and
conviction of the lesser, the court must give the lesser included
offense instruction.
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By instructing
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did not a l l o w the opti on of a ] esser i n c l u d e d o f f e n s brought to the jin:y.

This was r e v e r s i b l e

::_•

And b e c a u s e

c o u r t s must v i e w the facts in a light muyu ic
defendant,
that M r

ii

i:* i ^asonabj o

• ..^VP

a -in-r*

r e f u s e d to o b e y the sheriff's aeput**
e v i d e n c e •-b."3 5^:: :1 I osl
is r e q u i r e d

J

been met; consequently,

••;/ have
but

determined

merely

Th<- t w o - p a r t

I o determine w h e t h e r

to givpH the l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d

the

tble r o niie

• ^\ra:i-

S i m p s o n did not intend ;-„• :'.!-•«

:. - e

01 not. the trial

instruction

has

court

clearly

the lesser • i nc 1 nd* ,1 i nsli n o t i o n

should

have 1
Defendai:*
trial
I he

*
ji

instrucz2^.1

respectfully requests t h i s Court to r e v e r s e

o jLuiing and grant: I" "h" , ,S irnpscjii a n e w trial
e opportunity
.:

DATED THIS

to decide on the

the

a] l o w i n g

lesser-included

: isobeying a peace of f icer,

Jj^f\

day- of Kebruaiy, J '5.
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & ST1RLAND P.C.

THOMAS J. SCRIBI
Attorneys f o ? ppf end an t / Appe 1.1 ant
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APPENDIX

^1

41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic controllers.
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the latest
edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways."

APPENDIX !

41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop —
Fleeing — Causing property damage or bodily
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfeiture of vehicle — Penalties.
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall,
as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than
$1,000.
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
The court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of
not less than $5,000.
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other
section, an operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a
peace officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license
revoked pursuant to Subsection 41-2-127(l)(h) [53-3-220(l)(h)] for a period of one year.
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the
holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not
collect the driver's license but shall notify the division and the division
shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing state.

APPENDIX 3
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76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

APPENDIX 4
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Rule 21. Verdict.
(a) The verdict of the jury shall be either "guilty" or "not guilty," "not
guilty by reason of insanity," "guilty and mentally ill," or "not guilty of the
crime charged but guilty of a lesser included offense," or "not guilty of the
crime charged but guilty of a lesser included offense and mentally ill" provided that when the defense of mental illness has been asserted and the
defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the offense charged, the verdict shall be "not guilty by reason of
insanity."
(b) The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be returned by the jury to the
judge in open court and in the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the
defendant voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may be received in his
absence.
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at any time during its
deliberations may return a verdict or verdicts with respect to any defendant
as to whom it has agreed. If the jury cannot agree with respect to all, the
defendant or defendants as to whom it does not agree may be tried again.
(d) When the defendant may be convicted of more than one offense charged,
each offense of which the defendant is convicted shall be stated separately in
the verdict.
(e) The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the offense charged or to any
offense necessarily included in the offense charged or an attempt to commit
either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein.
(f) When a verdict is returned and before it is recorded, the jury shall be
polled at the request of any party or may be polled at the court's own instanceIf, upon the poll, there is no unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed
to retire for farther deliberations or may be discharged. If the verdict is unanimous, it shall be recorded.
(g) Ifjudgment of acquittal is given on a verdict or the case is dismissed and
the defendant is not detained for any other legal cause, he shall be discharged
gs soon as the judgment is given. If a verdict of guilty is returned, the court
may order the defendant to be taken into custody to await judgment on the
verdict or may permit the defendant to remain on bail.

